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International Space Law: Into the
Twenty-First Century
Glenn Harlan Reynolds*
ABSTRACT

In this Article, Professor Reynolds addresses the space law issues likely
to be of most importance in the next several decades. Pressing issues
include those of orbital debris and geostationaryorbit crowding, private
property rights in outer space resources, conflict over international
trade in space goods and services, the danger of ballistic-missile technology proliferation,private remote-sensing systems, and the law of international cooperation in space. Professor Reynolds concludes with a
philosophical and practical discussion of some more remote issues, including the legal systems that may govern future human societies in
outer space and the legal issues that might be associatedwith contacting
extraterrestrialintelligences.
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INTRODUCTION

The year 1992 marks many important occasions: the five-hundredth
anniversary of Columbus' voyage, the thirty-fifth anniversary of Sputnik,

and the seventy-fifth anniversary of the late, unlamented Bolshevik
Revolution. It also marks a less conspicuous date-the beginning of
space law's fifth decade. It was 1951, just over forty years ago, that saw
the publication of what many consider the first serious space law article,
by John Cobb Cooper of Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study.'
When Cooper's article was published, the very idea of space flight

itself seemed remote. Yet before twenty years were out, men (no women,
alas) would walk on the moon, only to abandon that initial foothold on
another planet in the interest of election-related pork-barreling. 2 Few
observers in 1951 would have imagined that we would go so far, so
fast-or that we would abandon our gains for such trivial reasons.
This record surely should make those of us who would forecast the
future humble. Among other things, it teaches us that progress in spacerelated matters is determined more by politics than by technology. Unfortunately, the course of technology is easier to predict-and usually to
follow-than politics. There are, as yet, no differential equations for

human behavior.
Nonetheless, I will make the attempt. The pages that follow will outline what I expect will be the most important issues of space law in the
next few decades, those representing the transition zone of the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first. I will also discuss a few other
issues that may be less likely to come up, but that will be important if
they do. Although my treatment of these topics will necessarily be a bit
1. John C. Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, 4 INT'L L.Q.
411 (1951). For a good history of space law's early days, see WALTER MCDOUGALL ....
THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE AGE 177-94
(1985).
2. The last lunar mission was Apollo 17, which lasted from December 7 through
December 19, 1972. In that same year, the Nixon Administration, with cooperation from
congressional Democrats, drastically scaled back plans for future space exploration. For a
complete listing of Apollo missions, see MICHAEL COLLINS, LIFTOFF 273-77 (1988). For
a discussion of the Nixon Administration's treatment of the space program in the context
of efforts to fund Nixon's election-year social agenda, see MCDOUGALL, supra note 1, at
420-23.
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brief, I hope that it nonetheless will be interesting, and I encourage
others-particularly student writers, who have long careers ahead of
them-to join in the discussion.
II.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Many people are surprised to learn that the seemingly limitless expanses of outer space might need environmental protection. The environmental problems of space, however, are bad and getting worse.' Already,
the orbits near Earth are so cluttered with human-made junk-mostly
fragments of discarded boosters and leftover shrapnel from antisatellite
weapons tests-that an object in those orbits is more likely to collide
with artificial debris than with naturally-occurring meteorites. More
alarming still, once that debris reaches a sufficient density, collisions between objects will create more debris particles, which will undergo still
more collisions, until the process becomes self-sustaining. This phenomenon is known in the trade as the "Kessler effect," named after an author
of the pioneering paper to analyze the topic." In addition, there is some
evidence that the growing quantity of human-created space junk is affecting the composition of the Van Allen radiation belts, although
whether this might affect conditions closer to Earth is unknown.'
Several potential approaches to these environmental problems have
been proposed. One is to address liability issues. I have previously suggested a Sindell-type market share liability regime6 under which nations
would pay compensation based on their proportional contribution to the

3. These issues are beginning to receive some attention. The new Restatement specifically addresses environmental problems involving international common areas, including
space. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 601 n.6. The Sierra
Club also has published an interesting and provocative book on the topic. See BEYOND
SPACESHIP EARTH: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND THE SOLAR SYSTEM (E. Hargrove
ed., 1986) [hereinafter BEYOND SPACESHIP EARTH]; see also Hartmann, Space Exploration and Environmental Issues, 6 ENVTL. ETHICS 227 (1984).
4. Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial
Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYS. RES. 2637 (1978). For more
on orbital debris, see HOWARD BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS (1989). See also Donald J. Kessler, Earth Orbital Pollution, in BEYOND SPACE-

supra note 3, at 47; Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of
Orbital Space Debris: Combining InternationalRegulatory and Liability Regimes, 15
SHIP EARTH,

B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 51 (1992).

5. See Andrei Konradi, Effect of the Orbital Debris Environment on the High-Energy Van Allen Proton Belt, 242 SCIENCE 1283 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980) (defendant's liability based on market share in offending product).
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orbital-debris population. This rule, of course, would not eliminate the
orbital-debris problems and should be regarded more as a means of
plugging holes in the Liability Convention' than of completely settling
the issue. Over the long term, some sort of prospective regulatory scheme
is likely to be necessary. It, too, should encourage nations to reduce their
contribution to the problem-perhaps by taxing practices in proportion
to the orbital debris they create, with proceeds going into a pool that
would pay for cleanup.' In the interim, at least the time has arrived for
the spacefaring nations to agree on sound practices for launch and onorbit activities to minimize the problem. In a limited and informal way,
this has already happened,1 ° but more needs to be done.
The orbital-debris question at least is beginning to receive the attention that it deserves, but it is not the only space environmental issue, just
the most pressing. Another is the crowding of the geostationary orbital
arc, the most suitable location for communications satellites. In essence,
the problem is that satellites cannot be placed too closely together without creating excessive radio interference. Because satellites must remain
within line of sight of their users, the problem is worse than it might
seem-the orbital arc is most crowded where it is most needed. The International Telecommunication Union has recently arrived at a temporary solution, but the underlying difficulty will resurface unless technology rides to the rescue first.'1
Finally, nations have obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and
under general principles of international law to avoid harmful contamination of other planets (for example, with micro-organisms from Earth)
and to avoid so-called "back contamination" of the Earth with harmful
extraterrestrial materials. 2 As plans go forward for both human and

7.

See

H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF
176-77 (1989); Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Law in the 1990s: An
Agenda for Research, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 6-7 (1991).
8. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. This treaty requires that one identify the
GLENN

LAW AND POLICY,

launching state of an object causing damage, which is likely to be difficult in the case of

damage caused by space debris, much of which is too small to track. A market-share
scheme would remove the need to identify the nation responsible for a particular piece of
debris and give all nations an incentive to reduce their contribution to the problem.
9. Lawrence Roberts has made some interesting suggestions along these lines, drawing on common-resource theories. See Roberts, supra note 4.
10. See NASA Strategy Aimed at Cutting Risk of Orbital Collisions, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Sept. 5, 1988, at 217.
11. For more on the ITU resolution, see Milton L. Smith, The Space WARC Concludes, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1989).
12. For this reason, space probes are sterilized before launch. For more on this issue,
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robotic missions to Mars (including sample-return missions), mission
planners and their counsel must consider both issues. Although it is
highly unlikely, according to most experts, that Earth organisms could
flourish on other planets, even in the comparatively friendly environment
of Mars, and even less likely that organisms from those planets could
infect life on Earth, the stakes are too high for carelessness until-as in
the case of these possibilities with respect to the moon after the repeated
Apollo visits-we have enough experience to feel secure.
III.

PROPERTY RIGHTS

A law professor of mine was fond of saying that he used to think that
all property was theft, but that was before he had anything worth stealing. This may turn out to be the story in the context of space property
rights. Some years ago, when the United States and the old Soviet Union
held a monopoly on space activity, considerable hostility existed to the
idea of property rights-or at least sovereignty, which is a different
thing-in space. This hostility stemmed from two sources: fear by the
have-not nations-all those without space capabilities-that the two
space powers would colonize the rest of the solar system, and fear by
each of the two space powers that the other would gain a decisive

advantage."3
In this context, the no-sovereignty provisions contained in article II of
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty14 can be seen as a way for everyone involved to hedge the bet. Article II provides the following: "[oluter space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or

see REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 195-98. For an earlier treatment, see Ste-

phen Gorove, Pollution and Outer Space: A Legal Analysis and Appraisal, 5 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L

L. & POL. 53 (1972). Under regulations that have remained in force since 1969,

NASA retains authority to quarantine extraterrestrial material and individuals and objects that have been exposed to extraterrestrial matter. Extraterrestrial Exposure, 14
C.F.R. §§ 1211.100-1211.108 (1991) [hereinafter Extraterrestrial Exposure Regula-

tions]. Although these regulations are unlikely to give rise to scenes like that at the end of
the movie E.T., they are evidence of the seriousness with which the United States has
treated its obligations on this matter in the past.
13. For an early discussion of these concerns, see Myres S. McDougal et al., The
Enjoyment and Acquisition of Resources in Outer Space, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 521
(1963).
14. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].

230
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by any other means."' 5 This provision limits the extension of national
territory, or imperium, to outer space. Some commentators also initially
argued that the provision outlaws private property rights in outer space,
but the consensus now is that it does not. 6 In the context of superpower
monopolies on space capability, and the Cold-War rivalry existing at the
time, the no-sovereignty provision allowed everyone to breathe easier.
The United States and the Soviet Union lost the opportunity to gain a
decisive advantage by securing a claim to the moon. On the other hand,
they were protected against the risk that the other would gain such a
claim first. They also were able to avoid having to deal with the resentments that non-space powers were beginning to feel over the prospect of
superpower expansion into a realm not accessible to anyone else, resentments that might have had a real impact on Cold-War diplomatic struggles. Meanwhile, the non-space powers were freed from the risk that
they would lose out entirely on the opening of a new frontier.
These concerns with space colonization reached a new high with the
1979 Moon Treaty, which entered into force in 1984-though without
the ratification of any major space power.' 7 The Moon Treaty represented the views of a then-influential group of developing-state economists who viewed Third World economic problems as resulting from
Western exploitation.' This group's push for a "New International Economic Order" was reflected in the Moon Treaty's hostile treatment of
not only national sovereignty (already forbidden by the 1967 Treaty),
but also of private property rights-with any for-profit exploitation of
space resources to be undertaken only by a monopolistic international
organization that would ensure that a share of the profits went to developing states.19
If the 1967 Treaty was something like an armistice in one part of the
Cold War, the 1979 Moon Treaty can be seen as a sort of pre-emptive
strike in the twenty-first century's economic wars. Being ahead of one's

15. Id. art. II, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208. For more on Article II and

its meaning, see REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 62-93; see also Carl Q. Christol, Article 2 of the 1967 PrinciplesTreaty Revisited, 9 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 217

(1984).
16. See Christol, supra note 16.
17. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/L.113/Add. 4 (1979).
18.

REYNOLDS

&

MERGES,

supra note 7, at 102-66.

19. For more on the Moon Treaty in general, and for a brief description of the New
International Economic Order, see REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 102-66. For
a recent statement of the Third-World perspective, see Mark Orlove, Spaced Out: The
Third World Looks for a Way in to Outer Space, 4

CONN. J. INT'L

L. 597 (1989).
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time, however, carries some risk, and the Moon Treaty-along, perhaps,
with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, depending on one's interpretation-is a treaty that is already obsolete. The economic theories and
political realities that led to both are not enough to justify retaining them
today and are likely to be less and less applicable in the coming years.
Today, space is not the sole preserve of the United States and the
Soviet Union (or its successor states). A potent European space program
now exists, Japan has a rapidly growing program, and Third-World
opinion leaders like China, India, and Brazil have important space programs, too. Nor are these states the only ones. Although the programs of
the United States and the former Soviet Union retain significant leads,
those leads no longer look unassailable. When significant exploitation of
space resources begins, many nations will be participating.
Furthermore, because of intervening events, the economic ideas that
underlay the Moon Treaty are no longer in fashion. At the time of the
Moon Treaty's drafting, many analysts disagreed with Walt Rostow's
theory that Third World nations would be able to catch up with more
developed nations.20 And, at the time, such disagreement might have
seemed well-founded, given the commanding lead of developed nations in
technology and economic clout. Thus, statements such as the following
were common:
Rostow, ignoring the phenomena of domination and imperialism, reduced
underdevelopment to a mere question of backwardness.... This soothing
belief in an automatic international redistribution of means and incomes
in accordance with some sort of natural law is completely unrealistic, since
it takes no account of the balance of power. The present international
situation is characterized by an intensification of conflict and a widening
of the differences in power between States."
Things are different now. The enormous economic progress of many formerly underdeveloped nations-such as Japan, South Korea, and the
other nations of the Pacific Rim-belies the notion that economic positions cannot change. Moreover, the futility of developed nations' efforts
to stem economic tides, in both the United States and the former Soviet
Union, undercuts the idea that political factors control economic outcomes. The result is that markets, once in bad repute, are now better
regarded.
With the Cold War over, and with redistributionist, anti-market inter20. See WALTER W. RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1961); Walter W. Rostow, The Take-off into Self-Sustained Growth, 66 ECON. J. 25 (1956).
21.

MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

67 (1979).
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national economic policies out of favor, the root causes of hostility to
property rights in outer space resources have disappeared. Accordingly,
no real reason seems to exist to adopt the rather strained interpretations
of the Outer Space Treaty that would prevent such property rights, or to
endorse the explicit Moon Treaty provisions, which would flatly bar
them. Simply deciding that property rights in outer space resources
would not be such a bad thing is not enough. Property rights, properly
implemented, would be a real boon to the rapid development of outer
space, with concurrent economic and political benefits to those of us here
on Earth.2 2 But the key concern is how such rights can be properly
implemented.
Well set up, property rights can serve as an important incentive to
outer space development because investors have a stake in success. That
is why land grants were so instrumental in the development of the western United States: the railroads, for example, received plots of land along
their rights of way. Without development, those plots of land would have
been near-valueless plots of wilderness. With development, they were attractively located along rail lines. Similarly, property rights could help to
promote development of space resources: without development, property
rights in, say, lunar land have virtually no worth, while with development, they could become highly valuable.2 3
On the other hand, property rights are also the kind of thing over
which people fight precisely because they are valuable. Taking someone
else's developed property is often easier than developing one's own. The
challenge is to build a regime that encourages the beneficial aspects of
property rights, while formulating rules that discourage conflict and

predation.2
Although decades will pass before this issue becomes immediately
pressing, it is worth addressing soon. Fortunately, a vehicle for discussing these issues already exists. By its own terms, the Moon Treaty comes

22.

For more on this topic, see Glenn H. Reynolds, Structuring Development in

Outer Space: Problems of How and Why, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 433 (1987)
(book review); REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 325-29. Cf. Lawrence D. Roberts, The Law of the Commons: A Frameworkfor the Efficient and Equitable Use of the
LaGrange Points, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 151 (1990).
23.
24.
tional
Glenn

See Reynolds, supra note 22, at 445-46.
For a not-entirely-dated description of how this might be done, stressing internacommercial development as a system for promoting the interests of peace, see
H. Reynolds & Robert P. Merges, The Role of Commercial Development in
Preventing War in Outer Space, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 130 (1985). See also Glenn H.

Reynolds, Toward the Peaceful Development of Outer Space: Some Thoughts on Structures and Relations, 59 TENN. L. REV. (1992) (forthcoming).
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up for review in the United Nations General Assembly in 1994, ten
years after its entry into force. Because this review will allow all nations-not just those few that actually ratified the Moon Treaty-to discuss proposed remedies for the Treaty's flaws, it will provide an opportunity to consider revisions. In particular, the United States should play
a major part by proposing amendments to the Treaty that recognize the
important role played by private property rights in promoting development of outer space. Land-grant type mechanisms, administered by the
United Nations or by individual nations in accordance with agreed international principles, might reward private development efforts with longterm leases or permanent property rights in space resources that they
develop. Structured properly, these mechanisms would promote a new
kind of space race-one aimed at peaceful development rather than military domination. That would be a promising start for a new century
indeed.
Some proposals have urged the United States to take unilateral action,

several of which have gone rather far. For example, one group of California space enthusiasts has discussed the possibility of the United States
simply repudiating the Outer Space Treaty's no-sovereignty provisions
and laying claim to the northern half of the moon.2 5 Such an action, in
my opinion, would be a bad idea and would probably lead to ugly international repercussions. Nevertheless, the United States could do many
things to promote space development through property rights that would
not involve violation of the no-sovereignty provision at all.
Armong other things, the United States simply could state that it would
recognize claims by United States nationals (and perhaps by others as
well) who discover valuable deposits of minerals or other wealth. Such
resources may exist on the moon or in near-Earth asteroids that could be
exploited relatively easily. Recognition of these claims (and protection of
them, if necessary, from third parties) would not constitute "national appropriation" or the exercise of sovereignty over territory, but rather the
exercise of United States jurisdiction over its citizens and of its power to
protect them against third parties in international common areas. 26

25. Members of the California Space Development Council discussed this "Luna
2010 Resolution" at meetings in 1991. For more on this topic, see Kenneth J. Garcia,

Space Experts Set Sights on the Moon for Colonization, L.A. TimFs, Dec. 27, 1991, at
Bl.
26. Indeed, even advocates of the New International Economic Order recognize that
such exploitation would not violate the Outer Space Treaty, which is why they considered the Moon Treaty desirable. See, e.g., Orlove, supra note 20, at 610. "[T]he Outer

Space Treaty, to which the space powers are a party, already grants the right to exploit
lunar resources." "[Tihe Outer Space Treaty, to which the major space powers are sig-
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Something similar has already been done with regard to an international common area sharing the res communis character of the space
environment. In 1980, the United States Congress passed the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (the Act), which established a mechanism for recognizing mining claims by United States ventures regarding
deep seabed mineral deposits outside the territorial jurisdiction of any
nation. 27 The Act specifically provides:
it is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for, and commercial recovery of, hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of those and other freedoms recognized
28
by general principles of international law.

The Act also provides that it is not to be considered an extension of

sovereignty over international common areas, but rather a mechanism for
recognizing the rights of United States nationals in those areas. Section
3(a) of the Act states that:
(a) Disclaimer of Extraterritorial Sovereignty-By the enactment of this
Act, the United States(1) exercises its jurisdiction over United States citizens and vessels, and
foreign persons and vessels otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, in the exercise of the high seas freedom to engage in exploration for, and commercial recovery of, hard mineral resources of the deep seabed in accordance
with generally accepted principles of international law recognized by the
United States; but
(2) does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or
jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or resources in the deep
seabed.2"

Because the Act applies to an international common area, the high seas,
with the same res communis legal character as outer space, it provides
an interesting precedent for unilateral United States efforts to recognize
property rights in outer space pending some agreed-upon international
regime.3 0
natories, prohibits only the appropriation of areas of outer space. Nowhere does the
Treaty mention non-appropriation of resources." Id. at 612.
27. Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980).
28. Id. at § 2(a)(12).
29. Id. at § 3(a).
30. The Act is used as an illustration only. For an update on what has occurred
since its adoption, see Katherine Dixon, Recent Development, Law of the Sea-Deep
Seabed Mining---United States Position in Light of Recent Agreement and Exchange of
Notes with Five CountriesInvolved in PreparatoryCommission of United Nations Con-
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This kind of scheme does not constitute the extension of sovereignty to

outer space; strictly speaking, it does not even constitute the creation of
full-fledged property rights. The right created by the provisions above is
not a fee simple absolute governing part of a celestial body, but rather an
extractive right as to certain resources. It is mineral right, or right of use.
Such rights are a kind of property, but they do not represent title to
land." The United States obligation under the Outer Space Treaty is
simply to refrain from acts that involve national appropriation. In the
absence of international agreements to the contrary, the United States is
free to experiment with methods of creating incentives for space development involving these rights and even involving methods in which enterprises do acquire absolute title to land. 2

vention on the Law of the Sea, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 497 (1988); Lee A. Kimball, Introductory Note, Belgium-Canada-Italy-Netherlands-Unionof Soviet Socialist
Republics: Agreement on the Resolution of PracticalProblems with Respect to Deep
Seabed Mining Areas, and Exchange of Notes Between the United States and the Parties to the Agreement, 26 I.L.M. 1502 (1987).
31. For more on this, see L.F.E. Goldie, Title and Use (and Usufruct)-An Ancient
Distinction Too Oft Forgot, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 713 (1985) (pointing out that the
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act creates only a right of use). "The issue of
territoriality, of both imperium and dominium, is irrelevant. The usufructuary enjoys his
privilege without needing to assert any titular right to the seabed adverse to the common
heritage of mankind .... "). Id. See also Reynolds & Merges, supra note 25, at 143-44
("Such assurance does not constitute a right to exclusive use of a resource, except in the
narrowest sense ....
Rather, it embodies the" very basic right to be left alone."); cf.
Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d
560 (5th Cir. 1981).
32. My thoughts on this topic have been heavily influenced by Wayne White, and I

strongly recommend his writings to all interested parties. See, e.g., Wayne White, Mining Law for Outer Space, in Proceedings, Tenth Annual Princeton/AIAA/Space Studies
Institute Conference on Space Manufacturing (1991). In particular, I should note
White's point that existing maritime law-which certainly provides a powerful analogy-already recognizes claims by telepresence, that is, by virtue of remote-control
robotic operations. For example, in Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. The
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, S.S. Central America, 1989
A.M.C. 1955 [American Maritime Cases] (E.D. Va. 1989), a United States District
Court recognized claims to abandoned property found as a result of the claimant's use of
telepresence. In a subsequent action by the same name, reported at 742 F.Supp. 1327,
1337 (E.D. Va. 1990), the court enjoined other potential salvors from entering a twentysquare-mile area around the ship. Given the likelihood that many for-profit operations in
outer space will involve extensive use of remote-control robots (or even autonomous or
semi-autonomous robots), this precedent is vitally important. For another, somewhat
similar approach, see Fred Kosmo, The Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory

Scheme that Promotes Commercial Ventures and InternationalResponsibility, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1055 (1988).
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Such efforts should be seen, however, as a transitional measure, not as
a substitute for an eventual international agreement. Nor would they be
uncontroversial, anymore than the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act has been. They may provide, however, the degree of security
necessary for early space resource ventures to secure capital for their

efforts. Although this is not the place to work out an approach in detail,
a full-scale property-rights regime would be desirable and probably
should possess the following characteristics. First, it should involve land
grants (or grants of other interests) that would be recognized at a minimum by all space powers and preferably by all nations on Earth. The
United Nations or some other international body may be suitable grantors. Second, those grants, like the railroad rights-of-way used to facilitate
the opening of the Western United States, should be contingent upon the
grantee actually developing the land in question. Third, the land (or
other interest) should be freely alienable, at least after development. This
will promote liquidity and capital formation. Fourth, reasonable access
and participation by non-space powers should be available, but only on
an at-risk basis. That is, less developed countries should be real participants, not simply possessors of a rake-off of any profits that may happen
to appear. Finally, realistic and practical dispute-resolution mechanisms
should exist to ensure that disputes (over boundaries, for example) remain peaceful.
These issues may or may not become concrete within the next couple
of decades. President Bush has proposed, and Congress has begun to
fund, a "Space Exploration Initiative" designed to return astronauts to
outer space beyond Earth orbit, beginning with the moon and Mars. As
part of the planning process for the Initiative, a commission headed by
former astronaut Thomas Stafford has proposed four different potential
architectures. 33 All of these architectures involve a return to the moon for
science and engineering; two involve a return to the moon for permanent
colonization and extraction of resources. The most ambitious, although
not necessarily the most expensive, involves lunar mining to support operations on the moon and Mars and the microwave beaming of solar
power back to Earth.34 If these programs are carried forward, they will
generate considerable interest in the availability of property rights and
other legal interests and quite possibly a good deal of international con-

33. See

AMERICA AT THE THRESHOLD: REPORT OF THE SYNTHESIS GROUP ON

AMERICA'S SPACE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE

(1991). For a brief summary and analysis

of the report, see Glenn H. Reynolds, The Synthesis Report, AD
39-42.
34. Reynolds, supra note 33, at 52-57.
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Oct. 1991, at
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troversy as well. Although the Stafford Commission's plans may well be
delayed by budget politics and post-Cold War adjustments, beginning to
talk about these issues seriously is important.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Ofie strong possibility, in this "New World Order" decade of international cooperation, is that many space efforts, possibly including all or
part of the Space Exploration Initiative, will be international efforts.
These efforts invariably involve complex negotiations and detailed written agreements covering such issues as jurisdiction, intellectual property
rights, and liability. One recent example is the set of agreements governing the multinational space station Freedom. 5 As the participants in
these agreements resolve thorny issues, they will refine the agreements in
many respects. This process eventually may produce a customary law of
international cooperation in space, a prospect that I find both interesting
and welcome.
V.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES

The steadily growing number of nations with some degree of space
capability means that space activity is no longer a monopoly of the two
superpowers (if the term "superpower" is even in vogue anymore). As a
result, competition in the provision of space goods and services, for a
profit or at least for a fee, also is growing.3" The different space submarkets-launch services, satellite hardware, space communications, remote sensing, radiolocation services, and others-are all at different
stages of maturity, but all are potential moneymakers and carry a considerable share of prestige and technology-forcing potential as well.
This may or may not be good. While vigorous competition in provid35. These agreements have received a good deal of attention in law reviews recently.
See, e.g., Katherine M. Gorove, The U.S. lInternational Space Station Agreement of
September 29, 1988. Some Legal Highlights, 16 J. SPACE L. 182 (1988); Mary B.
McCord, Responding to the Space Station Agreement: The Extension of U.S. Law into
Space, 77 GEo. L.J. 1933 (1989); Helen Shin, "Oh, I have slipped the surly bonds of
earth": Multinational Space-Stations and Choice of Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1375
(1990); David C. Stewart, Resolution of Legal Issues Confronting the International
Space Station Project: A Step Forward in the Development of Space Law, 29 VA. J.
INT'L L. 745 (1989).

36. See generally Elizabeth Corcoran & Tim Beardsley, The New Space Race, Sci.
AM., July, 1990, at 72 (growth of international competition in commercial space markets); Kevin M. Costello, The Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988 and
Launch Industry Insurance Reform, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 492, 492-507
(1991) (history of commercial space industries to present).
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ing space goods and services may drive prices down, benefiting users,
such competition may not drive costs down. This may mean that the
space markets will become a battleground of subsidies without space capabilities improving as they should. By "price" I mean the amount
charged customers; by "cost" I mean the total claim on societal resources
involved in providing a good or service. Subsidies lower prices, but they
do not affect costs-they merely shift costs from customers to some other
party, usually the taxpayer. A market characterized by extensive government subsidies rarely creates great gains in efficiency because efficiency
gains cost money to achieve-for example, through research and development-but confer no real competitive advantage because competitors
may simply increase the amount of government subsidy they receive.
Thus, even a low-priced space market, if characterized by government
subsidies, could have bad effects by discouraging technological developments that would lower costs and increase capabilities over the long
term.
There is some reason to fear that the natural trend in the space field is
toward such a market. Many nations are entering the field because of its
importance for prestige, because it is a technology driver, and because it
has considerable cross-fertilization potential with various military technologies, most notably those involved in the production of ballistic missiles. Having entered the field for non-market reasons, these nations may
well prove reluctant to depart it for market reasons. Considerable trade
friction already has occurred in the field. In the launch services arena,
one section 301 action actually has been filed, and another came to the
very brink of filing." In addition, Japanese satellite purchases were
named under a Super 301 trade proceeding initiated by the United
States Trade Representative. This was resolved after extensive negotiations.3 Other actions loom on the horizon.
Trade wars will harm the space industries and prevent free market
forces from playing their normal role of increasing efficiency and improving capabilities. The obvious solution is a well-tailored and enforceable trade agreement covering space goods and services. Some desultory
37. Transpace Carriers filed the first space-related section 301 action. It was filed
against the European Space Agency and the European launch company Arianespace.
Excerpts are reprinted in REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 232-34. The Reagan

Administration response appears at 50 Fed. Reg. 29,631 (1985). The second section 301
action was by the National Space Society, alleging that the Chinese government violated
a 1989 launch trade agreement with the United States. This action was filed for technical
review, but not action, on July 9, 1990. It was rendered moot by the enactment of a
presidential ban on satellite exports to China.
38. See 55 Fed. Reg. 25761 (June 22, 1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 18693 (May 3, 1990).
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work on this already has been done, with a number of semi-formal discussions among the United States and the European Space Agency and
the European Community on establishing ground rules for space trade.
Aggravating the problems are the close ties that space industries everywhere have to military research, development, and procurement administrations. These ties make subsidies hard to spot, or even to define. This
is true even in the United States, which has gone further down the road
toward a truly commercial space industry than any other nation. It is far
truer elsewhere."
Paradoxically, the other space-related trade problem stems from the
concern that space trade having to do with ballistic missile technologies
might be too free. Although the danger of ballistic missile proliferation
did not receive much attention prior to the Persian Gulf war, 40 an agreement among the major space powers has existed for some time that has
been aimed at preventing the spread of critical technologies involved in
the production and use of ballistic missiles. 41 This agreement is not
clearly adequate to the task, nor is any agreement clearly adequate to the
task. The technologies involved are simply too easy to learn and too eas-

ily implemented with readily available equipment to restrict completely.
Nonetheless, it is worth pursuing in considerable detail. Ultimately, vigorous and forceful diplomacy, not export-control law, will probably do
the most to control the spread of ballistic missiles.

VI.

REMOTE SENSING

The term "remote sensing" refers to a variety of information-gathering activities undertaken from space, such as satellite photography, infrared, laser, and radar imaging, and the gathering of electronic intelligence. Up to now, all such activity has been typically governmental in
nature, either through the various military spy satellites operated by the
superpowers, or through the far less capable public remote sensing systems, such as LANDSAT, operated by the United States through the

39.

For a discussion of these issues, see REYNOLDS &

MERGES,

supra note 7, at

229-38. See also Glenn H. Reynolds & Robert P. Merges, Toward an IndustrialPolicy
for Outer Space: Problems and Prospects of the Commercial Launch Industry, 29
J. 7 (1988).
40. But see Glenn H. Reynolds, National Security on the High Frontier,2

JURIMETRICS

HIGH

TECH. L.J. 281 (1987) (book review).
41. For a complete and up-to-date discussion of this issue, see McCall, "The Inexorable Advance of Technology?" United States and MultilateralEfforts to Curb Ballistic
Missile Proliferationand its Consequences, 32 JURIMETRICS J.

-

ing). See also REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 238-46.

(1992) (forthcom-
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EOSAT corporation, and SPOT, a French system. This governmental
monopoly exists for both historical and technological reasons. Until recently, satellite imaging systems have been prohibitively expensive for
private purchasers.
That is changing, and it is beginning to appear that private remote
sensing systems are becoming feasible. Within the next ten to twenty
years, a major news organization, or consortium of news organizations,
probably will orbit its own spy satellite to gather news that cannot be
gathered any other way. A good deal of discussion already has occurred
concerning this "mediasat" and the legal and political issues that it
would raise. Most discussion has centered around governmental efforts
to control the information produced by such a satellite for national security reasons.
If the United States asserted this control, serious First Amendment
questions would arise, although the regulations currently governing private remote sensing systems do not really reflect this problem. 42 Furthermore, these systems would face an uncertain international legal regime.
No existing international law prohibits the private remote sensing of
other nations. Many nations, however,. abhor the thought that other nations' satellites-perhaps under the control of large oil or mineral companies-might be learning more about their natural resources than they
themselves know.43 In addition, satellite photographs and data have obvious military importance. These photographs are far more likely to become available to hostile nations and groups if private systems produce
them-particularly those owned by the news media-than if superpower
intelligence agencies control them.
On the other hand, precisely because military officials would not control them, private remote sensing systems might play an important role
in keeping the peace. News media organizations and private arms-control groups with access to satellite data could play an important armscontrol monitoring role. Moreover, the general availability of this information would tend to discourage surprise attacks.
Currently, little law on the subject exists, and the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty's provision that outer space "shall be free for exploration and
use" is likely to pose a barrier to efforts to limit space-based remote

42. Licensing of Private Remote-Sensing Systems, 15 C.F.R. § 960 (1990). For a
discussion of private remote sensing systems in general and the United States regulations
specifically, see Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, News Media Satellites and the
First Amendment: A Case Study in the Treatment of New Technologies, 3 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1 (1988).
43. See Orlove, supra note 19, at 629-32.
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sensing in the name of national sovereignty. The issue, however, has not
been ignored. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) has issued principles on remote sensing that,
although they lack legal force, provide some guidance with respect to the
expectations of the international community." Among other things, these
principles provide that sensed states shall have access, on reasonable
terms, to the unenhanced data gathered by satellite imaging.
The principles are unlikely to be the last word on the subject, which
may well turn out to be a contentious one. Nevertheless, the great benefits promised by private remote sensing systems are likely to ensure that,
one way or another, they wind up flourishing.

VIl.

ARMS CONTROL

With the Cold War apparently over, the old disoutes45 about interpretation of the ABM treaty46 seem passE. Space-related arms control issues, however, are not dead. Certain military uses of space, for example,
as a staging point for nuclear weapons, are off-limits under the 1967
Outer Space Treaty. 47 This prohibition is so highly regarded that it
likely would be considered binding even as against nonsignatories.
Within a few decades, space-based lasers likely will be capable of menacing aircraft and even targets on the surface of the earth. Whether these
weapons would count as "weapons of mass destruction" under the
Treaty is unclear (although likely),4 but certainly they are likely to be
policed in some fashion. After all, if the prospect of being photographed
from a satellite creates uneasiness, the prospect of being incinerated from
one is likely to generate far stronger feelings. Finally, long-range plans
for mining asteroids or the moon often involve moving around large bod-

44. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space, reprinted in
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 191-94.
45. For discussions of these issues, see REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 96102. See also Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great ReinterpretationCaper, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1956 (1986); Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense
Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986).
46. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1975, U.S.U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435.
47. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. IV, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S at
208. Article IV of the Treaty provides in part: "States Parties to the Treaty undertake
not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction." Id.
48. See John M. Orr, Comment, The Treaty on Outer Space: An Evaluation of the
Arms Control Provisions, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1968).
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les of material in Earth orbit. Such activity also could be done for warlike purposes, with multiton bodies of rock or metal being directed at
targets on Earth with devastating effect. States will undoubtedly insist on
strict controls on such activity for safety's sake. Those enthusiastic about
the prospects for asteroid mining often forget this.
VIII.

MORE REMOTE ISSUES

I close my discussion with a brief treatment of two issues that are less
likely to come up in the next few decades, but that will be important
whenever they do arise. The first is the legal treatment of independent
(to a greater or lesser degree) space societies. The second is contact with
extraterrestrial intelligences. Both issues have interested many fine
minds,4 and both will certainly gain the attention of everyone else
should they become a reality.
A.

Governance of Space Societies

The problems of governing human societies in outer space no doubt
seem rather remote to most, perhaps making it surprising that the
Smithsonian Institution has published an entire book on the subject,"0
and that many writers-some quite eminent-have written about it or
participated in symposia on the topic."1 Yet the governance of space soci49.

See, e.g.,

ERNST FASAN,

RELATIONS

WITH EXTRATERRESTRIAL

INTELLI-

GENCES (1970); ANDREW HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 394-423 (1963);

MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE

(1963); Michael

A.G. Michaud, Interstellar Negotiation, FOREIGN SERVICE J., Dec. 1972, at 10. On
governance of space societies, see Justice William Brennan, Jr., Space Colonization and
the Law, 3 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 7 (1990). See also GEORGE S. ROBINSON & HAROLD
M. WHITE, JR., ENVOYS OF MANKIND (1986); John A. Ragosta & Glenn H. Reynolds,
In Search of GoverningPrinciples, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 473 (1988) (review essay). Both
topics are briefly surveyed in REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 307-23.
50. ROBINSON & WHITE, supra note 52. Of course, the Smithsonian has been ahead
of its time before. In 1919, it published a paper by Dr. Robert Goddard on liquid fuel
rocketry, A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes, despite the criticism of many who
considered Goddard a crank. Today, a copy of Goddard's paper, autographed by the
United States and Soviet crews of the Apollo/Soyuz mission, is in the National Air and
Space Museum's collection as a testament to the Smithsonian's farsightedness.
51. For example, the Governance in Space Project, a joint effort of the Smithsonian
Institution and Boston University's Center for Democracy, sponsored a series of meetings
coinciding with the Bicentennial of the Constitution that included such participants as
Justice William Brennan, Prof. A.E. Dick Howard, Walter Cronkite, William Rogers,
Thomas Pownall, John Glenn, and Frank Fahrenkopf, among others. These meetings
produced a Declaration of First Principles for the Governance of Space Societies that is
reprinted in REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 310-11. See also Justice William
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eties has managed to capture a great deal of interest, notwithstanding
that these societies are still years in the future.
Rudimentary space societies do exist now-in the form of Space Shuttle or space station crews-and there are even the beginnings of legal
principles to govern their operation.5 2 The chief interest of scholars and
commentators, however, is not these micro-societies, but rather the principles that will govern full-fledged permanent settlements, such as those
envisioned by Princeton physicist Gerard K. O'Neill 5 3 I will not attempt
to summarize the interesting literature that has developed on this issue,
but rather will make a few general points here.
First, I am a bit concerned by the way in which many writers assume
that space societies will necessarily be less free-that is, less amenable to
individual rights to lead different or unconventional lives free from societal restraint. The far-more-fragile life support systems of space societies
of course will require some degree of social control when activities that
might endanger others are concerned. For example, sabotage will no
doubt be sharply sanctioned, and many activities that are frequently tolerated on Earth (such as smoking) are likely to be strictly forbidden.
This control, however, need not extend to enforced conformity in other
areas when these concerns do not apply.
This, however, contradicts much of the literature. For example, William Wu argues that, "[s]pace colonists may face life on a political
leash," and compares space colony life to that in an oppressive company
town.

Brennan, Jr., Space Settlements and the Law: Address to the American Law Institute
Annual Dinner, May 21, 1987, reprinted in REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at
307.
52. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 451 (1988) (extending United States criminal jurisdiction
to outer space for some purposes); 35 U.S.C. "§ 105 (1992) (extending United States
patent law to cover inventions made, used, or sold on United States-registry spacecraft);
14 C.F.R. § 1214.702 (granting space shuttle commander legal authority to maintain
order and discipline in flight). For more on existing United States legislative and administrative law applying to in-space activity, see REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7; U.S.
CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SPACE STATIONS AND THE LAW:

SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (1986). See also Glenn H. Reynolds, Legislative Comment:
The Patents in Space Act, 3 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 13 (1990) (discussing legislation

extending United States patent law to United States-registry spacecraft); Glenn H.
Reynolds, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 431 (1987) (book review) (reviewing OTA space stations
paper); Leo Kanowitz, American Labor Law and the United States Space Shuttle, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 715 (1983); Karen Robbins, Comment, The Extension of United States
CriminalJurisdictionto Outer Space, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 627 (1983).
53. GERALD K. O'NEILL, THE HIGH FRONTIER (rev. ed. 1982) (describing feasibil-

ity in next century of orbital colonies containing 10,000 or more citizens).
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In a company town, freedom of expression may be in danger. Democracy
permits citizens to make public statements about political figures that they
would never say openly about their immediate bosses or top level officers
of the companies for which they work. The security and efficiency of a
well-organized and well-run company town in space might be politically
stifling... . The colonization of space may point toward a weakening
of
54
individual rights and a strengthening of government power.
Many other writers seem to share this view. Life in outer space, they
suggest, will be confined, regimented, and conformist; it would be more
like duty on a nuclear submarine than exploration of the final frontier.
Space colonists, because of their delicate life-support systems and preca-

rious social structures, will simply find freedom unaffordable.55 This
view is probably wrong, but nonetheless it concerns me a great deal.
It is probably wrong because all of the available evidence is that things
don't work this way. The closest current analogs to a space colony are
Antarctic bases. But these are not harsh, dictatorial environments. By
contrast, the kinds of conditions that Antarctic crews face tend to force
the abandonment of traditional hierarchical systems in favor of more
flexible ones:
A winter base in Antarctica is a unique world, where the cook often has
greater prestige than the officer-in-charge and the radio operator can have
more influence than an established scientist. The traditional hierarchical
structure of the military, and of government as a whole, breaks down....
This was a controversial and embarrassing realization for the Navy. Flexible authority and sharing of tasks among everyone are vital .... This can
run against the grain of highly specialized scientists and career military
officers. The absence of women was also a factor. Navy traditions excluded females from the continent, and this increased tensions.
Some lessons have been learned. With great reluctance, the Navy eventually allowed women on the continent ....
A more flexible organizational
structure is tolerated, and private enterprise is now providing some services and personnel....
The Antarctican experience reminds us that the dangers of mutiny or
psychosis in a space station or colony are as real as the threat of meteors

54. William Wu, Taking Liberties in Space, AD ASTRA, Nov. 1991, at 36. This
point is reinforced by recent movies, such as Outland and Total Recall, that depict life
in space colonies as harshly controlled.
55. This conclusion, for example, leads to a provision in the Declaration of First
Principles stressing the need to balance "community safety and individual survival within
the unique environment of space" with the exercise of "fundamental individual rights."
Reprinted in REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 7, at 311.
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or solar flares.56

Experience, thus, tends to suggest that overly rigid and controlled environments are harmful to survival under such conditions, not essential
to it. George Robinson and Harold White agree, stressing that "the real
answer to [space] community success probably lies in motivated, self-actualized, strong, adventurous,
unconventional, yet disciplined and well'5
trained human beings.

7

I said that the negative view of liberties in space societies worries me
even though it is probably wrong. Here is why. Although I find the topic
interesting, I cannot believe that the rather large amount of writing on
space societies is driven solely by interest in the topic itself. Space societies are interesting, but few of us are likely to see them in our lifetimes. I
believe that, consciously or unconsciously, interest in space societies is as
high as it is because their future in many ways mirrors our own. Many
characteristics of space societies, such as strong dependence on advanced
technology, problems with maintaining environmental quality, the need
for people to work together under stress, and individuals' strong dependence upon their society for basic necessities such as food and water, are
simply amplified images of characteristics already present, and growing,
in our own society.
This is a good reason for being interested in space societies, since by
studying their problems we gain a window into our future on Earth. It is
also a reason to be worried. For if there is a general belief that a high
level of interdependence and environmental fragility means that space
settlers will not be able to afford individual rights, then what of those of
us who remain on Earth under similar conditions? I do not believe that
the march of technology has made individual rights obsolete, but I worry
that others might reach that conclusion. And I believe that it is a wrong
conclusion. Just as space societies will need access to the creativity and
individual initiative of their inhabitants to flourish, so will societies on
Earth. Surely the failure of totalitarian societies worldwide to achieve
any kind of social-or even material-greatness should underscore that
need.

56.

Andrew Lawler, Lessons from the Past: Toward a Long-Term Space Policy, in
757, 762-63
(W.W. Mendell ed., 1985); see also Helmreich & Runge, Psychological Considerations
in Future Space Missions, in HUMAN FACTORS OF OUTER SPACE PRODUCTION (T.S.
Cheston & D.L. Winter eds., 1980); Alfred W. Crosby, Life (With All Its Problems) in
Space, in INTERSTELLAR MIGRATION AND THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE 210-19 (Ben R.
Finney & Eric M. Jones eds., 1985).
57. ROBINSON & WHITE, supra note 52, at 110.
LUNAR BASES AND SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
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Contact with ExtraterrestrialIntelligences

After the rather remote topic of space societies comes another topic
seemingly even more remote: contact with extraterrestrial intelligences.
Like the previous topic, this question is interesting not only for its own
sake, but for what it tells us about ourselves. The message here, however, is a bit more heartening.

The first question regarding extraterrestrial intelligences is the hardest
one: Do they exist at all? This is a tough question, and any answer is
largely meaningless as a result of the near-total absence of any data. We
know little about our own solar system, and the rest of the universe is
awfully large. Yet this inspires a certain kind of probabilistic reasoning.
Our own galaxy contains tens of billions of stars. Starting with this large
number, it seems that if only a tiny fraction of those stars have planets,
and if only a tiny fraction of planets have life, and if only a tiny fraction
of life is intelligent, then thousands of intelligent species around our galaxy still should exist, some of which should be relatively close to us. This
reasoning led physicist Enrico Fermi's plaintive cry, "Then where is
everybody?""
At any rate, our question is not whether intelligent life exists elsewhere, but what to do if we contact it. Contact could occur in several
ways. First, we might go to it, but our technological capabilities are unlikely to be up to this task for many decades, if not centuries. 59 Second, it
may come to us. This requires a very high level of technology on the
part of the aliens-at least in the realm of space transportation. The
58.
SEARCH

Quoted in Isaac Asimov, Terrestrial Intelligence, in FIRST
FOR

CONTACT: THE

EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCES (Ben Bova & Bryon Preiss eds.,

1990) [hereinafter FIRST CONTACT]. Fermi's question is so famous that in scientific circles the apparent contradiction, between so many opportunities for intelligent life and
only one known instance of it, is known as the "Fermi Paradox." First Contact contains
chapters by illustrious scientists, futurists, and science fiction writers including, among

many others, Frank Drake, Philip Morrison, Ben Bova, Arthur C. Clarke, Isaac
Asimov, and David Brin. It is probably the best current source of information on the
prospects for contacting other intelligences. See also Gregg Easterbrook, Are We Alone?,
ATLANTIC, Aug. 1988, at 25-38.

59. This assumes, of course, no other intelligent life lives within our solar system. In
a sense, this assumption is almost certainly wrong. Other species on Earth-such as
dolphins and chimpanzees-are quite intelligent. In fact, some believe that dolphins may
be as. intelligent as humans, if not more so. Our rather poor record at recognizing this
and at communicating with dolphins, even once we began to suspect that they might be
very bright, bodes poorly for our interactions with alien species. By "intelligent life,"
however, we typically mean "intelligent life possessing a level of technology close to or

superior to our own." Almost certainly, no such life, other than humanity, exists within

our solar system.
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legal problems that this sort of encounter might create would range from

the dramatic to the picayune, but most would be drowned in the political
backwash. Should this kind of contact occur, the prospects for humanity
may not be bright. Certainly the history of our own species suggests that
when technologically less-advanced cultures are brought into contact
with technologically more-advanced cultures, the less-advanced cultures
tend to suffer, both materially, through enslavement, exploitation, and so
on, and spiritually, through a pervasive sense of inferiority and selfalienation. 60 The legal challenges stemming from this contact would involve attempting to manage the contact to avoid the deleterious effects
while minimizing restraints on individual and academic freedom.,
Although the likelihood of this sort of event, quite literally, is incalculable,6 2 the potential consequences are significant enough that a bit of
preventive lawyering may be in order. The world community, in drawing back from the nuclear brink (something that itself seemed wildly
unlikely just a few years ago), has already taken one major step toward
rendering itself better able to deal with alien contact. A logical next step
would be for lawyers, scientists, and other interested parties to begin
thinking about how this contact would be managed if it should occur.63
This sort of group activity actually is beginning to happen. A recent
publication, First Contact: The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence,6 4 has brought together a number of these parties (including one

60.

For an illustration of this effect, see

COLIN

M.

TURNBULL,

THE LONELY AFRI-

CAN (1962).

61. About the only specific existing legal authority to cover such a situation is to be
found in the NASA quarantine regulations. See Extraterrestrial Exposure Regulations,

supra note 12. One should hope that these rather inartfully drawn regulations do not
indicate how deftly such issues would be handled should the event come to pass.
62. Two equally valid (or invalid) ways of looking at the question are possible: (1)
notwithstanding the claims of certain rather sensational popular writers, no evidence exists that humanity has ever been visited by extraterrestrial intelligences, so that the

probability of these visits, therefore, must be small; or (2) although humanity has never
been visited, this may simply mean that the time has now arrived-or, in the alternative,
now that our radio broadcasts are expanding out into the cosmos, our chances of being
noticed and investigated grow day by day. For more on this issue in particular, see W.T.
Sullivan, III, et al., Eavesdropping: The Radio Signature of Earth, 199 SCIENCE 377

(1978). Either approach depends on assumptions that are currently untestable; both may
in fact be wrong.
63. For many years, persistent rumors have circulated about secret agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union regarding military cooperation in
the event of alien invasion. While I have some doubt as to the truth of these rumors, such
agreements, even if in existence, would address only one facet of the problem, and probably the least important.
64. See supra note 59. The book is recommended highly to those interested in the
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lawyer)65 to address just this problem. Furthermore, a number of scientists involved in searching for extraterrestrial intelligence have drafted a

declaration of principles governing detection. 6 The text of that declaration follows:
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING AcTIvITIES FOLLOWING
THE DETECTION OF EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCE

We, the institutions and individuals participating in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence,
Recognizing that the search for extraterrestrial intelligence is an integral part of space exploration and is being undertaken for peaceful purposes and for the common interest of mankind,
Inspired by the profound significance for mankind of detecting evidence
of extraterrestrial intelligence, even though the probability of detection

may be low,
Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, which commits states as parties to that treaty "to inform
the Secretary General of the United Nations as well as the public and the
international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results" of their space exploration activities (Article XI),
Recognizing that any initial detection may be incomplete or ambiguous
and thus require careful examination as well as confirmation, and that it
is essential to maintain the highest standards of scientific responsibility
and credibility,
Agree to observe the following principles for disseminating information
about the detection of extraterrestrial intelligence:
1. Any individual, public or private research institution, or governmental agency that believes it has detected a signal from or other evidence of
extraterrestrial intelligence (the discoverer) should seek to verify that the

most plausible explanation for the evidence is the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence rather than some other natural phenomenon or anthropogenic phenomenon before making any public announcement. If the evidence cannot be confirmed as indicating the existence of extraterrestrial
intelligence, the discoverer may disseminate the information as appropriate to the discovery of any unknown phenomenon.
2. Prior to making a public announcement that evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence has been detected, the discoverer should promptly inform

subject.
65. State Department official Michael Michaud, a member of the International Institute of Space Law.
66.

Reprinted in Michael Michaud, A Unique Moment in Human History, in FIRST

CONTACT, supra note

59, at 243, 258-60.

19921

INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW

all other observers or research organizations that are parties to this declaration, so that those other parties may seek to confirm the discovery by
independent observations at other sites and so that a network can be established to enable continuous monitoring of the signal or phenomenon. Parties to this declaration should not make any public announcement of this
information until it is determined whether this information is or is not
credible evidence of the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence. The discoverer should inform his/her or its relevant national authorities.
3. After concluding that the discovery appears to be credible evidence of
extraterrestrial intelligence, and after informing other parties to this declaration, the discoverer should inform observers throughout the world
through the Central Bureau for Astronomical Telegrams of the International Astronomical Union, and should inform the Secretary General of
the United Nations in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Because of
their demonstrated interest in and expertise concerning the question of the
existence of extraterrestrial intelligence, the discoverer should simultaneously inform the following international institutions of the discovery and
should provide them with all pertinent data and recorded information concerning the evidence: the International Telecommunication Union, the
Committee on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific
Unions, the International Astronautical Federation, the International
Academy of Astronautics, the International Institute of Space Law and
Commission 51 of the International Astronomical Union.
4. A confirmed detection of extraterrestrial intelligence should be made
available to the international scientific community through publications,
meetings, conferences and other appropriate means.
5. All data necessary for confirmation of detection should be made
available to the international scientific community through publications,
meetings, conferences and other appropriate means.
6. The discovery should be confirmed and monitored and any data bearing on the evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence should be recorded and
stored permanently to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, in a
form that will make it available for further analysis and interpretation.
These recordings should be made available to the international institutions
listed above and to members of the scientific community for further objective analysis and interpretation.
7. If the evidence of detection is in the form of electromagnetic signals,
the parties to this declaration should seek international agreement to protect the appropriate frequencies by exercising the extraordinary procedures established within the World Administrative Radio Council of the
International Telecommunication Union.
8. No response to a signal or other evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence should be sent until appropriate international consultations have
taken place. The procedures for such consultations will be the subject of a
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separate agreement, declaration or arrangement.
9. The SETI Committee of the International Academy of Astronautics,
in coordination with Commission 51 of the International Astronomical
Union, will conduct a continuing review of procedures for the detection of
extraterrestrial intelligence and the subsequent handling of the data.
Should credible evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence be discovered, an
international committee of scientists and other experts should be established to serve as a focal point for continuing analysis of all observational
evidence collected in the aftermath of the discovery, and also to provide
advice on the release of information to the public. This committee should
be constituted from representatives of each of the international institutions
listed above and such other members as the committee may deem necessary. To facilitate the convocation of such a committee at some unknown
time in the future, the SETI Committee of the International Academy of
Astronautics should initiate and maintain a current list of willing representatives from each of the international institutions listed above, as well
as other individuals with relevant skills, and should make that list continuously available through the Secretariat of the International Academy of
Astronautics. The International Academy of Astronautics will act as the
Depositary for this declaration and will annually provide a current list of
parties to all the parties to this declaration.
The first point to be made about the Declaration is that it is not a
formal set of binding legal principles: it is an agreement among scientists, not among states. Of course, it does not necessarily lose importance,
or likelihood of being followed, for that reason. Indeed, agreements

among scientific researchers have a strong history of being followed and
this one is likely to be looked to should the event occur. Moreover, the
agreement, although it appears to contemplate the receipt of extraterrestrial radio signals as the most likely mode of contact, is not limited to

those occasions. Paragraph 1 refers to detection of "a signal from or
other evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence", language that clearly
reaches any situation in which extraterrestrial intelligence is discovered,

including radio signals, discovery of artifacts, and outright visits."'
Once discovery has been made and confirmed, the next question is:
what do we do? That is, if we receive alien communications, do we an67.

Although radio astronomy represents the most popular means of searching for

extraterrestrial intelligence, it is not the only method that has been used. For example,
scientists have examined locations in the solar system with optical, radar, and infrared
sensors for indications of alien artifacts (such as alien probes that might be monitoring
happenings on Earth). Others have inspected nearby stars for evidence of civilizations
that might have dumped nuclear waste into space, or constructed "Dyson sphere" shells
to capture solar energy, though so far none of these efforts has borne fruit. See Easterbrook, supra note 61.
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swer? Humans have already attempted communication with alien species
on a few occasions. We have placed gold plaques and recorded messages
on board space probes whose trajectories will ultimately take them into
interstellar space, and we have beamed messages from radio telescopes to
distant stars. This last effort, which Frank Drake originated in 1974,
drew considerable criticism regarding the right of a small group of scientists to speak quite literally for all humanity.6 8
One might argue that these criticisms are unfounded. Interstellar distances are so vast that voyages between stars must be prohibitively expensive, and besides, any alien species that might receive our messages
would be so technologically advanced as to be benign and harmless. The
trouble with these arguments is that we have no particular evidence to
support them. As to technology, the fact that we are unable to cross interstellar distances is hardly a guarantee that others may not be able to
do it-we are, after all, only a few decades past being unable to cross the
distance between the Earth and its moon. Anyone who has been at the
game of space travel at all has probably been at it longer than us. And
even we have the capacity, with technology readily extrapolatable from
the present, to send small packages across interstellar distances. If we
were paranoid enough, those packages could contain destructive nanodevices, or viruses, or other weapons that might be lethal even in small
quantities. I do not believe that humanity is, or is likely to be, that paranoid, but it might be unwise to assume that other species share our
disposition.
As for the argument that other, more advanced species necessarily
would be more benign, that too is based on certain assumptions-most
significantly, that intelligence is a civilizing factor. Scholars have noted
that human history provides little support for this claim. As Easterbrook
notes:
James Trefil, of George Mason University, has cautioned that if evolution functions approximately the same way on other worlds that it has
functioned here-conferring survival upon the fittest-advanced extraterrestrials might still be aggressive, territorial, and quick to reach for the
sword. In that case, counting on poor alien marksmanship might not be
prudent. Even if a message arrived from a great distance, we might for

defensive reasons be compelled to assume that the senders knew something

68. A history of these efforts appears in Michaud, supra note 69; a copy of the
message beamed by Drake, which included information on human beings and our location, appears at 255; a copy of a recorded image from a Voyager probe appears on 248.
A copy of the gold plaque affixed to United States space probes beginning with Pioneer
10 appears earlier in the same volume at 185.
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about the speed-of-light barrier that we didn't, and withhold our reply.
The most disquieting aspect of natural selection as observed on Earth is
that it channels intellect to predators. Most bright animals are carnivores:
stalking requires tactics, pattern recognition, and, for social animals, coordinated action, all incubators of brainpower. . . This isn't much of a
testimonial to "intelligence" [as a guarantee of nonviolence].6 9
Perhaps an alien civilization would have outgrown its violent tendencies,
even if innate, by the time it reached a level of technology that would
allow it to contact us. Again, we cannot know. Logically, a species that
has attained technological maturity without destroying itself ought to
have tamed its innate tendencies toward violence-perhaps, however, it
has merely learned to channel them exclusively outward, which would
be cold comfort to humanity. Furthermore, based on our own experience,
technological progress does not necessarily produce tendencies toward
nonviolence. As Easterbrook notes:
Regrettably, the one example we have-human history-does not bear out
an assertion that technical progress and social wisdom are natural partners. Our technology has grown in almost magical fashion over the past
2,000 years, but foreign policy is still practiced pretty much as it was
70
during the Roman Empire.
While we should not allow our fears that an alien civilization might
be hostile and paranoid to render us hostile and paranoid ourselves, these
concerns certainly suggest that our approach should be cautious. The
Outer Space Treaty's requirement that our activities in outer space

should be "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries" 1 rein-

forces this suggestion. Various scholars have discussed this problem from
different perspectives. Andrew Haley formulated a rule of "metalaw" for
dealing with other species that revises the Golden Rule: "Do unto others
as they would have done unto them." As Haley says, "To treat others as
we would desire to be treated might well mean their destruction. 7' 2 Obviously, the limits to this principle begin to appear when the others' interests begin to collide with our own: science fiction fans might call this
the "Klingon Corollary." And, of course, there is no guarantee that other
civilizations would adopt the same rule.
As always, McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic are more concerned with
matters of power and relationship than Haley. They outline a number of

69. Easterbrook, supra note 61, at 37.
70. Id.
71. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. I, 18 U.S.T. at 2412-13, 610 U.N.T.S.
at 207-08.
72. HALEY, supra note 51, at 395.
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possible scenarios in which aliens quarantine the Earth (as too violent),
or in which groups on Earth conspire with aliens (or even with dissident
groups within alien societies) in various power-bloc games, or in which
even an inferior Earth makes use of balance-of-power diplomacy, setting
rival alien groups against one another to maintain its own
independence. 3
Ernst Fasan takes an approach that combines some aspects of the two.
Stressing that our ability to interact with alien species will be greater or
lesser depending on how much we have in common with them, he recommends that we base our treatment of those species on Kantian principles. He proceeds to derive a number of universal rules for dealing with
74
alien species based on natural law and the categorical imperative.
Other philosophers have addressed this issue in various other terms.7 5
The scientists in the field have considered this approach as well. One
group has developed a set of proposed rules, entitled Proposed Protocol
for the Sending of Communication to ExtraterrestrialIntelligence, to
76
govern contact with extraterrestrials once they have been discovered.
Those rules follow:
PROPOSED PROTOCOL FOR THE SENDING OF COMMUNICATIONS TO
EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCE

The Signatories agree that communications with extraterrestrial intelligence will be guided by the following principles:
1. Communications with extraterrestrial intelligence will be undertaken
on behalf of all mankind, rather than specific nations, groups, or
individuals.
2. Nations, organizations, and individuals will not unilaterally send
communications to extraterrestrial intelligence until appropriate international consultations have taken place.
3. The Signatories will not cooperate with attempts to communicate
with extraterrestrial intelligence which do not conform to the principles in
this protocol.
4. An international group including representation from all interested
nations will be formed to deal with the question of whether such a communication should be sent and, if so, what its content should be.

73. McDOUGAL, supra note 51, at 974-1021.
74. FASAN, supra note 51.
75. See, e.g., ROBERT NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 417 (1981); Callicott, Moral Considerabilityand ExtraterrestrialLife, in BEYOND SPACESHIP EARTH,
supra note 3, at 227; Tooley, Would ETIs [ExtraterrestrialIntelligences]Be Persons?
in EXTRATERRESTRIAL

INTELLIGENCE: THE FIRST ENCOUNTER

1976).

76. Reprinted in FIRST
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5. If a decision is made to develop a communication to extraterrestrial
intelligence on behalf of mankind, the following principles will be
observed:
a. Respect for the value of life and intelligence.
b. Respect for the value of diversity, including respect for different customs, habits, languages, creeds and religions, approaches to social organization, and styles of life.
c. Respect for the territory and property of others.
d. Recognition of the will to live.
e. Recognition of the need for living space.
f. Fair play, justice, mercy.
g. Reciprocity and quid pro quo.
h. Nonviolation of others.
i. Truthfulness and non-deception.
j. Peaceful and friendly welcome.
k. Cooperation.
1. Respect for knowledge, curiosity, and learning.
6. The drafters of a communication to extraterrestrial intelligence will
consider detailed information about mankind to be a commodity of high
value which will not be transmitted without due attention to human security and well-being, and to reciprocity.
7. In the event that extraterrestrials appear to pose a threat to human
health, well-being, or peace, no nation shall act without consulting the
Security Council of the United Nations.
Although less ambitious than some of the scholarly writings mentioned
earlier, the proposed rules make some important points. First, contact
with alien intelligences would represent an event so important that a
decent respect for the well-being of humanity would forbid any individual or single nation from going ahead without proper consultation. Second, dealings with extraterrestrial beings would set such an important
precedent that they should be conducted in a manner that is straightforward, honest, and considerate. Third, the stakes would be so high that
we should be cautious about revealing too much until we are very sure
about the consequences. Finally, nations should make responses to any
threats a global matter, not an individual one. In the unlikely, but horrific, circumstances of an encounter with hostile aliens, we would want
all humanity united from the beginning.
One fascinating aspect of the draft proposal-and, indeed, all thinking
about contact with extraterrestrials-is the way in which our vision of
this contact, taking place as it does against a blank slate, is in large part
a product of our own hopes, fears, and predispositions. Between the lines
in both of the scientists' documents noted above is a sense that they
would most likely be communicating with their opposite numbers-aliens, perhaps, but alien scientists. On the other hand, a healthy
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dose of caution remains, perhaps because scientists themselves know,
from long and sometimes bitter experience, that while doing their jobs,
they are often doing the bidding of others less scrupulous. Our vision of
intelligent aliens has wavered back and forth over the years. Sometimes,
our vision has reflected Cold War paranoia; aliens are viewed as malevolent invaders, either wielding weapons of fearsome destructiveness or
weaving deceptions of astonishing subtlety," or both. Other times, especially more recently, they are pictured as noble teachers, far better than
we poor humans, come to save us from ourselves, and bring us enlightenment. In reality, of course, neither is likely to be true. The one prediction I feel fairly confident in making is that if we encounter intelligent
extraterrestrials, we will be surprised regardless of how much we have
thought about the subject.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In this rather brief and sketchy treatment, I have outlined a number of
different issues. Some are of immediate importance: with orbital debris
already altering the character of the Van Allen radiation belts thousands
of miles into space and threatening spacecraft now in orbit with lethal
collisions, we cannot afford to wait. With the Moon Treaty coming up
for review in the United Nations General Assembly in 1994, this is the
time to begin thinking very seriously about the place of resource-extraction rights since it is the failure of the Moon Treaty to recognize those

rights that has doomed it to marginality since its entry into force. Other
issues I have discussed are likely to materialize only well into the next
century, if then.
In spite of these differences, all of these issues-and, indeed, all of the
issues of space law generally-have one common feature. To take space
law seriously, one must believe in a future in which humanity flourishes,
and one in which law can make a difference for good. To me, that is
part of the appeal. I hope that it is for others as well.

77. In many of the most obviously Cold War-inspired visions, alien beings (like communists) were able to disguise themselves effortlessly as normal human beings until the
appointed time came to strike.

